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Introduction
The aim the Labour Government’s employment policy is “… to
ensure a higher proportion of people in work than ever before by
2010.” (HM Treasury, 2003, para 4.1). For disabled people this
has been translated into a Public Service Agreement target for the
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) of increasing over the
three years to 2006 the employment rate of people with disabilities
and significantly reducing the difference between this rate and the
overall employment rate. The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP)
is Labour’s main employment programme for people in receipt of a
disability or incapacity-related benefit, and, as a member of a
‘family’ of New Deal programmes, is an important component of the
Government’s welfare to work strategy (Stafford, 2003b). NDDP
was piloted and then in 2001 extended nationally.
This chapter discusses both the pilot and nationally extended
versions of NDDP. It has three main sections. The first part briefly
outlines the main features of NDDP, and the second focuses on
some of the key findings that have emerged from published
evaluations of NDDP. The final section concludes by arguing that a
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rigorous evaluation of NDDP should be welcomed by those with an
interest in helping incapacity benefit recipients into employment.
New Deal for Disabled People: An Overview
NDDP aims to help people claiming incapacity-related benefits
move into sustained employment. For both pilot and national
extension versions participation in the programme is voluntary and
is open to anyone claiming a qualifying benefit (see Table 1). The
programme is delivered by not-for-profit, private and public sector
organisations and providers have been encouraged to be innovative
so “transforming the way in which the benefits system supports
disabled people who want to work” (DWP, 1998: 3)
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New Deal for Disabled People
Pilots
New Deal for Disabled People national
extension
Incapacitated for work for 28
weeks or more and claiming:
Incapacity Benefit
Severe Disablement
Allowance
National Insurance
credits on grounds of
incapacity.
Programme could also be
provided to people in
employment and at risk of
losing their jobs due to ill-
health.
Incapacity Benefit
Severe Disablement Allowance
Income Support with a Disability
Premium
Income Support pending the result of an
appeal against disallowance from
Incapacity Benefit
Housing Benefit or Council Tax Benefit
with a Disability Premium*
Disability Living Allowance*
War Pension with an Unemployability
Supplement
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit
with an Unemployability Supplement
National Insurance credits on grounds of
incapacity
Equivalent benefits to Incapacity Benefit
being imported into Great Britain
under European Community
Regulations on the co-ordination of
social security and the terms of the
European Economic Area Agreement.
Table 1 NDDP qualifying benefits
 Provided it is paid in respect of the recipient herself/himself, and
recipient is not in paid work of 16 hours a week or more, or getting
Jobseekers Allowance.
Source: Stafford (2003a)
Two variants of NDDP were piloted and operated between
September 1998 and June 2001: the Personal Adviser Service
(PAS) and the Innovative Schemes. In the 12 PAS pilot areas a
personal adviser assisted people claiming incapacity-benefits to
find and retain employment. The then Employment Service ran six
of the pilots, and the remainder were operated by partnerships of
private and voluntary sector organizations.1 The Innovative
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Schemes were established to pilot approaches to tackling disabled
people’s barriers to work and assisting them into work, which if
successful could be replicated. Contracts to run the schemes were
awarded to a variety of private and voluntary sector organizations.
In July 2001 NDDP was, using the Government’s terminology,
‘extended’ nationally rather than ‘rolled out’. Although the pilots
informed the design of the national extension, policy makers
wanted to ‘test’ on a national scale further measures to help people
claiming incapacity-related benefits move into work. The national
extension to NDDP is delivered by around 60 Job Brokers, who are
organizations from the not-for-profit, private and public sectors.2
These organisations competitively tendered to deliver NDDP
initially until March 2004, there have been additional rounds of
procurement and the programme has been extended for a further
two years to March 2006.
Some Job Brokers have specific expertise in a ‘disability’ and
others are generalists. Each Job Broker covers a specific
geographical area, some serve single local authorities whilst others
larger areas. People wanting to participate in the programme have
to register with a Job Broker.
There is also an ‘NDDP Gateway’ at Jobcentre Plus offices. When
personal advisers conduct work focused interviews for new and
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repeat claimants they should inform claimants of both the
programme and local job brokering services. People registering for
NDDP continue to have access to ‘mainstream’ support
programmes, but have to access them through Jobcentre Plus.
Government funding for the national extension is outcome related.
Job Brokers received a registration fee of £100 per participant and
outcome payments for both job entries and sustained
employment.3 The actual amount received by Job Brokers varies
and depends upon what they negotiated as part of the
procurement process. Job Brokers (and others) have been critical
of the funding regime, although there was some support amongst
Job Brokers for the principle of outcome funding (Corden et al.,
2003). The consequences for Job Brokers vary. In some
organisations the job broking service was financially integrated
and effectively cushioned by other income streams, some Job
Brokers were prepared to tolerate some level of financial loss and
some experienced cash flow problems. Some felt that the levels of
funding were too low and that Job Brokers carried too much of the
financial risk. Lower than anticipated take-up and greater
difficulties than expected in moving some clients into work have
exacerbated the funding situation for some Job Brokers.
Unlike some other New Deals, NDDP does not include an
employment option with a subsidy payable to employers. Although
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some Job Brokers do offer such payments to employers, it is
claimed that the lack of a national subsidy scheme makes NDDP
clients less attractive relative to other New Deal clients.
NDDP also operates within a wider policy climate of work
incentives, tax changes and employment service initiatives and
schemes aimed at specific client groups or geographical areas. It is
a supply side measure and whilst it can be seen as part of a wider
package of measures, it arguably could be more effectively
embedded with other policies that aim to advance the social and
employment rights of disabled people.
Three
Key findings from evaluations of NDDP
This section highlights some of the key findings from published
evaluations of NDDP. Currently, there is a body of evidence on the
implementation and delivery of the pilots and national extension,
and a largely descriptive account of the programme’s outcomes or
impacts. Moreover, at the time writing the findings for the national
extension cover only the first 18 months of the programme. The
evaluation of the national version of NDDP is on-going and further
findings will enter the public domain.
Low take-up of the programme by individuals
Arguably, a feature of the pilots and the national extension is that
the take-up of NDDP is relatively low (Loumidis et al., 2001a;
Corden et al., 2003; Woodward et al., 2003). The take-up rate for
the PAS pilot was 7% (as at November 2000), a total of 18,166
clients; and in addition, nearly 5,200 clients registered for the
Innovative Schemes. The estimated take-up rate for the national
extension is lower at 1.9 per cent (Stafford, et al., 2004).
Qualitative research reveals that whilst the experiences of
individual Job Brokers vary, the take-up of the national
programme is less than they had expected (Corden et al., 2003).
The difference in the take-up rates of the PAS and national
extension is intriguing. The take-up of the national extension can
be expected to increase over time. However, it will be interesting to
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see whether it ever reaches 7%. Given the similarities between the
two versions of NDDP, if the take-up rate for the national extension
does not match that for the PAS, then this might be an example of
a ‘pilot effect’, whereby the energy and possibly enthusiasm
generated by a pilot cannot be reproduced at national level.
The relatively low take-up of NDDP reflects that (Arthur et al.,
1999; Loumidis et al., 2001; Hills et al., 2001; Corden et al., 2003;
Woodward et al., 2003):
 The most common reason given by potential clients for not
participating was that they were too unwell.
 Providers have been critical of the scale of national marketing
and of the materials used. For instance, providers in the PAS
pilot and national extension have been disappointed by the
content of publicity letters and leaflets sent to the client group
by the Department for Work and Pensions.
 The number of referrals from other organisations was lower
than anticipated and some of those referred could be judged
‘unsuitable’ for the programme.
 Some people did not identify themselves as ‘disabled’ and the
name of the programme implied that it was not relevant to their
needs.
Not surprisingly, levels of awareness of the programme are modest.
In the PAS pilot only a half of surveyed non-participants had heard
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of NDDP (Loumidis et al., 2001a); similarly, one year after the
national extension was implemented over a half of the eligible
population had heard of NDDP and/or a Job Broker operating in
their area (Woodward et al., 2003). Pilot and national evaluations
have tentatively identified potential users of NDDP; and Woodward
et al. (2003) suggest that around 15 per cent of those flowing onto
incapacity-related benefits and seven per cent of existing recipients
could use the service.
However, and as pointed out below, NDDP was never resourced to
address the needs of the entire eligible population and the
achieved take-up rates are possibly what would be expected for a
voluntary programme aimed at this client group. Moreover, it is
debatable whether awareness levels of around a half of the in-
scope population are seen as a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ in marketing
terms.
Selection of clients by providers
The target population for NDDP is very heterogeneous. Whilst
some pilot providers and Job Brokers worked with people who
were a ‘long distance’ from the labour market there was a tendency
for participants to be closer to the labour market than non-
participants (Hills et al., 2001; Loumidis et al., 2001 REF-
presumably 2001a?). Indeed, over time as the PAS pilot became
more focused on employment as the primary programme outcome
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only those people closer to the labour market were caseloaded by
advisers. Although some Job Brokers did not select at registration
and could be opposed to the idea, the funding regime for the
national extension did lead some Job Brokers to prioritise those
clients who were more ‘job ready’. These clients required less
support and were more likely to generate an outcome related
payment (Corden et al., 2003). Where work was seen as a longer-
term prospect or high levels of support were needed, individuals
could be referred to other services or other options like voluntary
work, and discouraged from registering for NDDP. Moreover,
following changes in Job Brokers funding arrangements in late
2003, Job Brokers are required, under their contract, to ensure
that at least 25% of their registrations lead to a job outcome.
Arguably, limited resources and targets that focus on job entries
mean some form of selection by providers is inevitable. NDDP was
never resourced (£197 million for the pilots and £120 million for
the national extension) to meet the needs of the entire eligible
population. Whether it should have been is another question. A
characteristic of New Deals aimed at their entire in-scope
populations, such New Deal for Young People, is that they are
mandatory. There is little or no support for a compulsory NDDP,
and the selection of participants can be seen as a structural
consequence of a voluntary programme. Nonetheless, the NDDP
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funding regime has been criticised because it cannot provide the
intensive support needed for those with significant impairments.
Partnership working is important
Pilot providers and Job Brokers usually worked in partnership
with other organisations (Loumidis et al., 2001; Hills et al., 2001;
Corden et al., 2003). Some partners had a more strategic or
advisory role, others a more operational role. Working with others
can mean delivering better, more comprehensive services to
clients, but building relationships takes time and resources that
were often not available. There was no single model of partnership
working in the pilots and over time relationships were fluid.
Providers learnt that it was important to manage the organisations’
different agendas, to maintain shared objectives and to be clear
about respective roles.
The qualitative research with Job Brokers also highlighted one of
the lessons of the pilot, namely, the importance of providers’ links
with benefit and employment services, as they are a potential
source of referrals and provide access to programmes, such as
Access to Work.4 However, pilot providers and Job Brokers did not
always have an easy relationship with benefit and employment
services. The number of referrals, for instance, could be fewer
than desired, and Jobcentre (Plus) staff could perceive the
providers’ services as being in competition with their own
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(Loumidis et al., 2001; Hills et al., 2001; Corden et al., 2003).
There were, though, examples of good relationships (often based on
existing contacts or other contracts) (Hills et al., 2001; Corden et
al., 2003), and the pilots imply that relationships improve over
time.
Frontline staff have a critical role
Although frontline staff have a key role in the delivery of NDDP
(Hills et al., 2001; Loumidis et al., 2001a), there is no single model
of staff organisation. The pilots also demonstrate that staff
delivering NDDP required a wide range of knowledge and skills
(Hills et al., 2001; Loumidis et al., 2001a). Staff needed to have an
understanding of the needs of the client group, of disability, of
benefit and employment services and of local employers, as well as
technical, personal and interpersonal skills. Some pilot providers
believed that the competencies required were too diverse and
subsequently a degree of specialisation of tasks amongst staff
emerged. The Job Brokers also seemed to have different models
for organising staff, and the extent to which they had generic or
specialised roles varied (Corden et al., 2003; McDonald et al.,
2004). Generic roles enabled staff to develop an in-depth
understanding of the client and their needs, clients only had to
give information once and staff welcomed the autonomy it gave
them. Whilst specialist roles, such as in job-searching or working
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with employers, allowed staff to develop expertise and strengthen
the service delivered, as well as emphasising team working.
Working with employers is important
Employers’ awareness of New Deal, as a brand, is relatively high,
but was much lower for the nationally extended NDDP (Aston et
al., 2003). Nevertheless, links with employers are important to the
success of NDDP. For instance, the evaluation of the Innovative
Schemes showed that schemes with good contacts with employers
were more successful at finding job opportunities for clients (Hills
et al., 2001). Providers’ success in engaging employers varied,
some employers were committed to employing disabled people
others less so (Hills et al., 2001; Loumidis et al., 2001; Aston et al.,
2003). However, working with employers could be a slow process,
and providers were not always able to maintain the necessary
sizable investment in time and effort (Hills et al., 2001; Loumidis et
al., 2001).
Employers’ low level of awareness of NDDP was partly because
contacts with employers tended to be made by clients (Aston et al.,
2003). This was perceived as beneficial by some employers as it
left them in control of their recruitment and selection procedures.
For clients wary of being labelled ‘disabled’ it also meant that
employers did not know they were registered on NDDP. This did
not prevent Job Brokers working with clients behind the scenes.
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However, some clients were disappointed that Job Brokers did not
have more extensive contacts with employers (see below) (Corden
et al., 2003).
Approaches by Job Brokers were usually client-driven and in
response to an advertised vacancy (Aston et al., 2003). During the
first year of the national extension there were few examples of
longer-term employer-Job Broker relationships. Nevertheless, Job
Brokers were planning to develop their links with employers later
on (Corden et al., 2003), a pattern of development that was
characteristic of the PAS pilot (Loumidis et al., 2003).
Clients were generally positive about NDDP
In general, clients were positive about NDDP, they valued how
services were delivered and actual services provided (Hills et al.,
2001; Loumidis et al., 2001; Corden et al., 2003). Overall, clients
held positive opinions about staff and were satisfied with their
progression towards employment.
However, it is inevitable that with services aimed at such a
heterogeneous user group there are some who were disappointed
and dissatisfied with the programme. For some clients the
programme did not maintain a sense of progression towards work
and/or they were critical of the quality of service provision (Hills et
al., 2001; Loumidis et al., 2001a). The early findings from the
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national extension suggest that dissatisfaction with NDDP arises
when clients’ expectations are not fulfilled (Corden et al., 2003).
Clients contact Job Brokers with a wide range of aims and
aspirations, some are more work-focused than others Whilst the
Job Brokers service, itself, offers a diverse range of opportunities.
The extent to which clients’ expectations were met will depend
upon how well they match with a particular Job Broker’s
provision. Corden et al. (2003) suggests reducing the risk of a poor
match requires potential clients to be better informed about what
specific Job Brokers can offer and what is expected of them.
Employment outcomes
Although employment outcomes are not the only possible measure
of the success of NDDP they are central to any assessment of the
programme. The original target for the national extension of NDDP
was 90,000 job entries over three years (Employment Service,
2000).
Different evaluation designs have been utilised to compare what
did happen following the introduction of the programme with what
would have happened in its absence. The latter (known as the
counterfactual) is required if estimates of the net impact of the
programme are to be made. The evaluation design of the PAS pilot
included an ‘area’ comparison, whereby outcomes for the 12 pilot
areas were to be compared against a national survey of the
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incapacity benefit population (Loumidis et al., 2001b). However,
the final report of the independent evaluation did not report any
estimate of the net impact of the Service. This was mainly because
of a poor match between those that participated in PAS and
respondents in the national survey. Instead, the then Department
for Social Security attempted an estimate of the impact of the pilot
using administrative data (Redway, 2001). However, due to small
sample sizes, it was unable to measure any increase in moves off
incapacity benefits by the eligible population in the 12 PAS pilots.
In basic terms:
 by June 2000 39% of participants in the tranche 1 Innovation
Schemes and 26% in tranche 2 schemes had moved into work
(Hills et al., 2001)
 by November 2000, 26% of participants (4,800) in PAS areas
had moved into employment (Loumidis et al., 2001)
 between July 2001 and June 2004 there were 99,260
registrations with Job Brokers, of whom 46% (45,390) had
moved into employment (DWP, 2004)
However, what is unknown is how many of those moving into work
would have done so in the absence of the programme. Whether
NDDP has a significant impact on employment outcomes is,
therefore, unproven. Hopefully, the on-going evaluation of the
national extension of NDDP will provide an assessment of whether
or not the programme makes a difference.
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In-work support
The pilots identified the need for in-work support if former clients
were to achieve sustained employment. In-work support is a
feature of the national extension and Job Brokers receive a
payment if their clients’ employment is sustained. The definition
of sustained employment was initially employment lasting for at
least 26 weeks out of the first 39 weeks since job entry. Following
the extension of Job Brokers contracts in October 2003, the
threshold for sustained employment has been reduced to 13
weeks. This might not seem to be a very long period of time, but it
does make NDDP compatible with the definition used for other New
Deals.
Qualitative research with employers, clients and Job Brokers
reveals little evidence of active in-work support by Job Brokers.
This might reflect the nascent nature of the service, and levels of
in-work provision may increase as more clients move into
employment, or it might mean that there is a low demand for in-
work services, but this is unlikely.
Cost effectiveness
There is limited evidence on the cost effectiveness of NDDP.
Tentative estimates for the pilots show that the cost per job (Dean
and Kent, 2001):
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 by end March 2001 for the PAS pilots delivered by the then
Employment Service was £2,400 and for the other PAS pilots
was £4,100.
 between August 1998 and end May 2000 for the tranche 1
Innovative Schemes it was £3,700 and between July 1999 and
end March 2000 it was £3,100 for tranche 2 schemes.
These figures are averages, and costs per job did decline over time
and vary by pilot location. Furthermore, they do not take account
of wider benefits and costs, such as benefit savings, and exclude
any additional jobs generated by the pilots. Without a net impact
assessment it is difficult to know if NDDP represents good value for
money. The on-going evaluation of NDDP includes a cost benefit
analysis, consequently whether an NDDP type programme
represents good value for money may be know in the future.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has reviewed key findings from the published
evaluations of NDDP. The scope of the findings to some extent
mirror the research designs followed. Thus there is a body of
knowledge emerging on the process of implementing and delivering
NDDP, but there is limited information on the impact of the
programme. Whilst the evaluations also incorporate a longitudinal
dimension, they do not provide information on the longer-term
outcomes of NDDP; so whether the programme has any lasting
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impact or if participants and non-participants tend to arrive at the
‘same’ destination is unknown.
The evaluation of the national extension of NDDP is, at the time of
writing, on-going. It was originally conceived as a social
experiment, with Job Brokers’ clients randomly assigned to action
and control groups. Such a design would have provided policy-
makers, providers and disabled people with creditable and robust
estimates of the net impact and value for money (through a cost-
benefit analysis) of NDDP. However, using random assignment
with the client group was highly contentious, and Ministers
decided not to proceed with an experimental design in December
2001. Hopefully, survey and administrative data will eventually
provide an assessment of the impact of NDDP. Such an
assessment is important to all those with an interest in disability
and employment issues because of the emphasis placed on
evidence based policy making by Government.
Reassuringly, there is a high degree of consistency between
findings from the pilots and the national extension. The pilot
findings cover two years, effectively the early and later stages of the
pilots, whilst the findings for the national extension encompass
only its 18 months of operation. This similarity is to be expected
as the target populations are essentially the same (mainly
recipients of Incapacity Benefit) and the services provides are
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broadly the same (principally caseworkers offering a fairly low level
intervention to people who are relatively close to the labour
market). Over time more significant differences between the pilots
and the national extension may emerge. Nonetheless, whatever
happens rigorous evaluation of NDDP should be welcomed by
those with an interest in helping incapacity benefit recipients move
into employment, in particular assessing the net impact of
employment and other outcomes is vital.
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1 The Employment Service and parts of the Benefits Agency were merged in
April 2002 to form Jobcentre Plus, which provides both benefit and employment
services for all people of working age. As part of the roll-out of Jobcentre Plus,
new and repeat claimants must attend a work focused interview with a personal
adviser.
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